The German problem. by Wade, Robert Hunter
  
Robert Wade 
The German problem 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Wade, Robert (2017). The German problem. The Economist . ISSN 0013-0613 
 
© 2017 The Economist Newspaper Publisher  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84090/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
“The German problem” 
 
Regarding your argument that Germany’s current-account 
surplus is damaging the world economy (“Vorsprung durch 
Angst”, July 8th), we should explore multilateral ways to put 
pressure on surplus countries to reduce their surpluses, so 
that not all the adjustment pressure falls on the deficit 
countries. It is much easier for surplus countries to spend 
down their surpluses (such as by importing more) than for 
deficit countries to squeeze the living conditions of their 
populations sufficiently to cut their deficits without the boost 
that would come from selling more to the surplus countries. 
 
This is hardly a new idea. The British delegation at the 
Bretton Woods conference of 1944 proposed an 
“international clearing union”, in which symmetrical 
adjustment pressure could be applied (such as interest 
charges on countries’ surpluses). America, which had a large 
surplus at the time, rejected it out of hand. The European 
Payments Union, from 1950 to 1958, put the international 
clearing-house idea into practice, though without the added 
function of encouraging surplus countries to cut their 
surpluses. Today we can draw inspiration from the earlier 
experience and start to explore a multilateral mechanism for 
applying more symmetrical pressure on surplus and deficit 
countries. The idea is not pie-in-the-sky. 
 
 
